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REGULATING ORGANIC FOOD:  
THE CASE FOR THE NATIONAL ORGANIC STANDARDS BOARD 
by Jason Marisam (Class of 2008) 
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(This paper is submitted in satisfaction of the course requirement for  
Food and Drug Law, Winter Term 2008, Peter Barton Hutt)   1 
ABSTRACT 
The  organic  food  industry  involves  a  mix  of  diverse  interest  groups,  including  agrarian 
purists,  “big  organic”  industry,  environmentalists,  and  consumer  interest  groups.      This 
paper addresses how the different institutions charged with overseeing organic food to one 
extent or another – the USDA, the National Organic Standards Board, and the courts – 
should interact to produce the best regulations for organic food.  The paper advances four 
arguments.  First, courts lack competency in the area of organic food.  Second, the USDA is 
not always transparent in its oversight and may in fact favor big organic businesses over 
other interests.  Third, the NOSB has the expertise that the courts lack and the transparent 
deliberation that makes its decisions less vulnerable to charges of unfairness or favoritism.  
Fourth, courts should typically defer to the USDA on organic food decisions.  But courts 
should help ensure that the USDA follows NOSB proposals by engaging in more searching 
review  of  agency  rules  and  regulations  that  are  misaligned  with  the  advisory  board’s 
recommendations.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Regulating organic food is a messy endeavor.  The slew of diverse interest groups 
involved makes it so.  “Big organic” businesses often want to relax the standards that their 
products must meet to earn the “USDA Organic” stamp.  Meanwhile, organic movement purists 
routinely demand stricter regulations that adhere to agrarian ideals.  In the mix are also 
environmentalists, consumers, the agents that certify organic food, and food distributors.  With 
that in mind, Congress charged the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) with 
regulating organic food and established the National Organic Standards Board (NOSB) – an 
advisory body whose members represent each of the various interests in organics – to help.  This 
paper addresses a question of administrative law and institutional competencies: that is, what is 
the best way for the USDA, the NOSB, and the courts to interact when it comes to the regulation 
of organic food?   
The paper advances four claims – the first three descriptive and the fourth normative.  
First, courts lack the expertise and competence to properly decide regulatory issues on organic   2 
food.
1  These shortcomings apply to many technical and scientific administrative law matters that 
courts face, and organic food regulation is no exception.  Informed oversight of organics requires 
technical agricultural knowledge, as well as an awareness of and sensitivity to the myriad value-
laden issues at stake – not least of which is what it means to call something “organic.”  
Generalist courts are not well-situated to make these judgments.  Their lack of competence here 
is exemplified by the landmark organic food case Harvey v. Veneman
2 – a disastrous opinion by 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals that Congress had to reverse with new legislation.  Although 
the statute at issue in that case was poorly worded in parts, the court’s intervention exposed their 
incompetence in the area and made matters worse.  Ultimately, the Chevron
3 doctrine of 
deference to agency expertise is particularly applicable for organic food regulation. 
Second, the USDA, while possessing far more agricultural expertise than federal courts, 
may adopt decision-making processes that are undemocratic and subject to interest group 
capture.
4  One example is the agency’s April 2004 guidance statements on organics, which were 
written behind closed doors and were intended to effect changes pleasing to big organic 
businesses.  The agency ultimately rescinded the rules.  But the whole affair raised suspicions, 
particularly among organic purists, and demonstrated the risk that USDA decisions on organics 
may lack the open deliberation and compromise needed for an industry replete with diverse 
interests.   
Third, the NOSB is well-situated to overcome the weaknesses inherent in both the courts’ 
and USDA’s decision-making processes on organic food.
5  The board consists of expert 
                                                 
1 See infra Part III(A). 
2 396 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2005). 
3 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (establishing judicial 
deference to agencies through a two-step inquiry into legislative intent and the reasonableness of the agency action).   
4 See infra Part III(B). 
5 See infra Part III(C).   3 
members who reflect the multitude of interests in the organic movement.  Its recommendations 
are likely educated compromises.  Moreover, the board’s meetings are open to the public, whose 
input is welcome and considered.  In short, the board possesses the expertise the courts lack, and 
it embodies the democratic ideals of transparency and deliberation – making it less likely to shut 
out certain voices and interests from its decision-making processes.  The board is less likely than 
the USDA to be captured by special interests because, by congressional mandate, its membership 
includes representatives from a slew of interests (not just powerful, well-organized ones) and its 
decision-making meetings are open to the public – unlike the USDA, which can meet with 
special interests behind closed doors and craft guidance statements without any public 
transparency. 
Fourth, given the NOSB’s advantages, the USDA should give great weight to the board’s 
recommendations.
6  One way to ensure such deference is for Congress to mandate it; however, 
for reasons discussed later, such formal grants of authority to the board are unlikely.  This paper 
argues instead that indirect pressure through the federal courts is the best way to encourage the 
USDA to follow the NOSB.  That is, federal courts should defer to USDA expertise generally, 
but they should engage in more searching review for organic rules and regulations that depart 
substantively from NOSB recommendations.  Judges may lack the expertise to routinely question 
the detailed organic food regulations, but they are likely competent to consider process-related 
questions, such as whether the NOSB’s recommendations were duly considered.  Moreover, any 
chance of judicial error is minimized if the court’s opinion matches up with the expert views of 
NOSB members.   
This paper is not arguing that courts should ignore clear statutory language and blindly 
follow the NOSB.  Rather, when statutory language is ambiguous (as it often is and particularly 
                                                 
6 See infra Part III(D).   4 
has been for organic food law), courts should look hard to see whether the agency gave due 
weight to NOSB recommendations.  Agency rules and guidance documents that are crafted in the 
absence of great public scrutiny and unduly ignore NOSB suggestions are more likely to have 
been the product of agency capture.  With NOSB’s expertise and transparently-formed 
compromise proposals to back it up, a court should feel more comfortable striking down an 
organic food regulation from the USDA, even though the court generally lacks the competence 
to interfere in such matters with confidence.     
  In sum, generalist courts lack expertise in the area of organic food.  The USDA has 
exhibited a lack of transparent deliberation in issuing organic food rules.  The NOSB, by its 
nature, is best situated to propose informed, compromise regulations in an open, deliberative 
manner.  Courts should ensure that the USDA typically follows these proposals by engaging in 
more searching review of agency rules and regulations that unduly discount the advisory board’s 
recommendations. 
  This paper proceeds as follows.  Part II(A) discusses the Organic Foods Production Act 
of 1990 (OFPA)
7, which established national regulation of organic food.  It focuses on the 
legislative history, the diversity of interest groups involved, and the creation of the NOSB.  Part 
II(B) highlights rules and regulations passed under OFPA, and Part II(C) analyzes the landmark 
organic foods case Harvey v. Veneman and its aftermath.  Part III presents the paper’s four major 
claims.  
 
II.  ORGANICS: LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
   
(A) The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 
                                                 
7 7 U.S.C. § § 6501-6522 (2006).   5 
(i)Background to the Legislation 
Organic food is a highly-regulated, $15 billion industry.
8  But two decades ago, it was a 
largely unregulated industry full of potential – but also rife with misleading labels and barriers to 
entry for organic producers.  The regulations that were in place came from a patchwork of state 
laws.
9  Before 1990, only seven states had certification programs under which organic food could 
be labeled “organic.”
10  An additional fifteen states defined “organic” by law but had no 
certification process.
11  The remaining twenty-eight states did not address “organic” at all.
12   
As a result, most U.S. consumers had no uniform standard to tell them what they were 
getting when they purchased an organic product.  As one commentator put it: “[B]uying organics 
in the absence of regulation involved guesswork and led many consumers to shy away from 
buying organic because of confusing labels.”
13  Moreover, this uncertainty and the fractious, 
state-by-state market were roadblocks to building a national industry. 
In the late 1980s, those in the organic food business lobbied Congress to establish 
uniform standards that organic consumers, producers, handlers, processors, and distributors 
could all rely on.  After researching the issue, Congress found that, indeed, the current regulatory 
mess was a hindrance to consumer-friendly interstate organic commerce.
14   Studies showed that 
food labeled “organic” could range from 20% to 100% consisting of organically-grown 
ingredients, creating the perfect opportunity for disingenuous businessmen to fleece consumers 
                                                 
8 See Organic Trade Association, 2006 Manufacturer Survey, available at 
http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/short%20overview%20MMS.pdf.  
9 For a more complete background of state regulation of organic food before 1990, see Part III of Jessica Ellsworth, 
The History of Organic Food Regulation (2001), in Peter Barton Hutt, ed., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: AN ELECTRONIC 
BOOK OF STUDENT PAPERS. 
10 See id. at 5. 
11 This left organic producers and handlers in these states to rely on independent associations to certify their 
products as “organic” if they wanted to make any organic claims to catch consumers’ attention.   See id. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
14See Rick Franzen, Will GATT Take a Bite Out of the Organic Food Production Act of 1990, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 399, 402 (1998) (discussing mislabeling and the fleecing of consumers in the unregulated organics market).   6 
with misleading labels.
15  Congress concluded that uniform federal standards could ameliorate 
consumer confusion and help secure a robust organic market.  Led by Senator Patrick Leahy, a 
Vermont Democrat, it took up the task of crafting a comprehensive regulatory scheme for 
organic food.
16   
(ii) A Diversity of Interests 
It was immediately clear that such broad legislation would pique the interest of 
extraordinarily diverse and eclectic groups.  Samuel Fromartz, a journalist and author of the 
exhaustively-researched book Organic, Inc., characterized the spectrum of participants in the 
organic industry as follows:    
There were environmentalists concerned about how pesticides could leach into the water 
supply.  Consumer groups were interested in seeing a viable organic market.  Organic 
certifiers who wanted clear standards to enforce.  Nutritionists interested in the healthful 
effects of organic food.  Chefs were interested in the increased flavors of organics.  But 
the two biggest interest groups were agrarians who had a “purist” vision of organic – that 
is, “small farms, whole food, and local distribution, not factory farms, highly processed 
food, and national sales” – and “big organic” that viewed the organic label as a business 
and marketing opportunity.
17  
The agrarian purists saw themselves as upholding ideals that transcended crass 
capitalistic goals.  At the Upper Midwest Organic Farming Conference in 2004, one small farmer 
presented a well-received vision of the organic movement with radical roots tied to the 
“indigenous farmer” and based on “local food sovereignty” – under which farm workers were 
                                                 
15 See Ellsworth, supra note 9, at 5. 
16 See Patrick Leahy, United States Senator, Issues: Organic Foods and Products, 
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/Agriculture/organicsindex.html. 
17 SAMUEL FROMARTZ, ORGANIC, INC. 194 (2006).   7 
treated well, their was fair pricing for small farmers, and growers could use their own resources 
without being forces to buy patented versions owned by conglomerates.
18   
For purists, the antithesis of this vision is embodied by what Michael Pollan – the 
nation’s most prominent writer on the business, ethics, and health of our modern food supply – 
dubbed the “organic-industrial complex.”
19  For Pollan, small organic purists have reason to fear 
that “big organic” companies will co-opt their purist vision of organic food.  Consider, for 
example, that international industrial food companies have bought many companies that started 
as small organic brands – witness General Mills purchasing Small Planet Foods and Group 
Danone (makers of Dannon Yogurt) buying Stonyfield Farms, which started as a small farm in 
New Hampshire.
20 
Ultimately, this diversity of interests, coupled with the mistrust between the impassioned 
purists and the big organic businesses, meant that whatever eventually passed Congress would 
include a hefty amount of compromise.  Indeed, the drafting process was contentious at first.  “It 
was very, very difficult, if not impossible, to get groups to sit down together and agree that there 
was one common cause that was called organic, or even that there was some benefit to us 
agreeing with each other,” observed the executive director of the Organic Trade Association.
21 
                                                 
18 Id. at 189. 
19 Michael Pollan, Naturally: Behind the Organic-Industrial Complex, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, May 13, 2001; 
see also MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA (2006). 
20 See The Organic Myth: Pastoral Ideals Are Getting Tramples as Organic Food Goes Mass Market, BUSINESS 
WEEK, Oct. 16, 2006, Cover Story. 
21 Fromartz, supra note 17, at 195.  Elsewhere in his book, Fromartz describes it this way:  
They may be driven by health and nutritional concerns, a family or personal history of 
illness, fear of pesticides, environmental ideals, adherence to principles of agrarianism or 
biodynamics, spiritual or religious beliefs, a desire for high-quality fresh food, left- or 
right-wing  politics,  a  commitment  to  sustainable  farming,  economic  necessity  or 
economic opportunism.  This diversity has always been a strength of the movement, 
since it increases the pool of potential consumers and prevents any one interest group 
from controlling its fates.  At the same time, it has led to pitched conflicts, especially 
between those who are determined to grow organic farming above all and those who 
primarily want to protect family farmers from economic annihilation.  But one belief 
about food unites all – they are the alternative to the status quo.    8 
(iii) Enactment 
Nonetheless, in 1990, a compromise was reached and Congress passed the Organic Food 
Protection Act.  The Act set up the National Organic Program (NOP) as the regulatory 
framework that the USDA would administer in governing organic food.
22  The regulatory 
scheme had three explicit aims: (1) to establish national standards “governing the marketing” of 
organically produced products; (2) “to assure consumers that organically produced products meet 
a consistent standard”; and (3) to facilitate a national market for organic products.
23   
Absent from the OFPA, though, was any definition of “organic.”  It left that to the 
expertise of the USDA.
24  Nonetheless, Congress provided several key guidelines for the USDA 
– guidelines that would frame the contentious bargaining among the diverse interests.  One 
important guideline outlined how farmers and food producers must transition their conventional 
operations into organic ones.
25  This included, for example, how long livestock had to eat organic 
food before their meat or dairy products could be considered organic.  Another guideline 
involved the use of synthetic chemicals in the production of organic products.  The OFPA 
established the baseline presumption that synthetics are entirely prohibited in the production and 
handling of organic products.  However, OFPA allowed for the compilation of a National List of 
acceptable synthetic chemicals, which were to be evaluated to ensure that they were not harmful 
                                                                                                                                                            
Id. at 18. 
22 See generally National Organic Program: Background and History, 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/nop2000/nop/background and history2.htm. 
23 See 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).  “[T]he imposition of a system which would both domestically and internationally 
align the monetary incentives of producers and consumers of organic food was an overarching congressional 
objective,” one commentator noted.  Beth Dungey, Drafting Organic Food Regulation: The Case for Incorporating 
Congressional Intent and Interest Group Commentary (1999), in Peter Barton Hutt, ed., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: AN 
ELECTRONIC BOOK OF STUDENT PAPERS. 
24 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6517-6518 (2006). 
25 Id. § 6504.   9 
to human health or the environment and that they were consistent with the overall process of 
organic farming and handling.
26    
(iv) NOSB 
Perhaps most important, the OFPA established the National Organic Standard Board.  
The Senate Committee envisioned the NOSB as “an essential advisor to the Secretary on all 
issues concerning this bill.”
27  Indeed, one commentator has observed: “References to the NOSB 
appear throughout OFPA, and taken together with the importance attached to the NOSB's 
function in the legislative history, it becomes abundantly clear the NOSB is a very strong 
component of the organic regulatory scheme.”
28 
The OFPA mandates that the fifteen-member board include representatives from all the 
relevant interest groups.
29  Today, sitting on the board are four organic farmers, three 
environmentalists, two organic handlers, three consumer advocates, one certifying agent, one 
organic retailer, and one scientist.
30  Members, who will serve staggered five year terms, are 
appointed by the secretary of agriculture.   
Like all advisory bodies, NOSB’s actions are nonbinding on federal agencies and the 
secretary of agriculture.
31  Nonetheless, its recommendations address almost all of the essential 
facets of organic food regulation.  Primarily, the board helps develop standards for the 
substances used in organic production, including making recommendations on which synthetic 
chemicals should make it on the National List and the precise regulations that farmers must 
                                                 
26 Id. § 6517. 
27 S. Rep. No. 101-357, at 650-51 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4950. 
28 Chad M. Kruse, The Not-So-Organic Dairy Regulations of the Organic Food Production Act of 1990, 30 S. ILL. 
U. L. J. 501, 511 (2006). 
29 7 U.S.C. § 6518 (2006). 
30 See National Organic Standards Board, http://www.ams.usda.gov/nosb/. 
31 7 U.S.C. § 6518 (2006).    10 
adhere to when converting operations to organic.
32  The board was designed in part as a check on 
“big organic” interests, helping guard against the secretary of agriculture approving countless 
synthetics to the dismay of purists.  Samuel Fromartz dubbed the board members the “high 
priests” of the organic world.
33     
 
(B) The Rules and Regulations 
  (i) Drafting the Rules 
After the OFPA was passed in 1990, the USDA set out to draft the first set of rules and 
regulations.  Conflict was immediate.  Board members bristled at the USDA treating them as 
“subservient.”
34  Indeed, after the USDA published its first round of proposed final rules under 
the OFPA,
35 it had disregarded many of the board’s recommendations.
36  This angered some who 
viewed the USDA as beholden to big business and big organic interests – that is, not the interests 
of agrarian purists.
37  Comments griped that the rules “completely disregard the long established 
meaning of organic agriculture” or that they could “fatally undermine consumer confidence in 
the organic label.”
38  Interestingly though, the USDA withdrew the proposals after it was 
inundated with complaints during the notice and comment period for the proposals.  It had 
received 275,000 comments on the proposals, the vast majority negative.
39  After the outpouring 
of public sentiment, the USDA took to redrafting the rules, in many ways making them stricter 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 FROMARTZ, supra note 17, at 197. 
34 See id. at 198. 
35 USDA, Glickman to Announce National Organic Program Proposed Rule, Dec. 12, 1997, 62 FR 65850. 
36 See Dungey, supra note 23, at 32 (“The Proposed Rule effectively erodes NOSB's statutory authority . . . 
by altering the recommended National List and by ignoring or twisting NOSB's other recommendations in 
the following areas . . . .”). 
37 For a complete chronicling of public and interest group reaction to the proposed rules, see id. at 33-42. 
38 FROMARTZ, supra note 17, at 199. 
39 See id. at 199.   11 
and more in line with the NOSB’s recommendations.
40  The redrafting process, and the nature of 
agency rulemaking in general, slowed the implementation of final rules.  It was not until 2002, 
twelve years after the OFPA was passed, that the USDA’s final rules took effect.   
(ii) USDA Guidance Statement Challenge 
Despite losing to the NOSB in the initial drafting process, the USDA tried again to push 
through rules that favored big organic businesses.  In April 2004, the USDA issued a guidance 
statement that would change several rules in controversial ways.  Guidance statements are not 
subject to a public notice and comment period, giving the secretary of agriculture room to make 
substantive interpretations under the radar.
41  Moreover, the statements are not prejudged by the 
NOSB.     
The April 2004 statement made several changes that many felt watered down the 
regulations severely.  First, it allowed organic producers to use pesticides with “unknown inert 
ingredients” so long as they made a “reasonable effort” to identify those ingredients.
 42  
Previously, any use of pesticides had to be approved by the NOSB; this change ostensibly 
pushed the board out of the way when it came to pesticides and organics.  Second, the statement 
allowed organic livestock to feed on fishmeal that may contain synthetic preservatives or toxins; 
a significant relaxation from the previous standard that required organic feed only.
43  Third, the 
statement allowed cattle producing organic milk to be treated with antibiotics under certain 
conditions.
44  The earlier regulation had required that all antibiotic-treated cattle be removed 
from organic herds.  Finally, the USDA allowed seafood, pet food, and body care products to 
                                                 
40 National Organic Program, Final Rule, 65 FED. REG., 80548 (2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. 205). 
41 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (discussing the difference between interpretive rules and legislative rules). 
42 See Carol Ness, Organic Food Fight: Outcry Over Rule Changes that Allow More Pesticides, Hormones, S.F. 
CHRON., May 22, 2004, at A1. 
43 See id. 
44 See id.   12 
carry an “organic” label “without meeting any standards other than their own.”  The earlier 
regulation required these categories of products to follow the standards used for organic 
livestock and crops.
45   
Organic interest groups were outraged.
46  At the NOSB’s meeting, “a parade of 
commentators chastised the USDA officials who attended.”
47  Their position was 
understandable, given that Congress had envisioned the NOSB to serve as “an essential advisor”
 
48 to the USDA, but that these guidance documents “undermined the NOSB.”
49  Clearly the 
secretary had not sought its guidance before issuing the April 2004 statement, and in fact she had 
explicitly undercut the board’s advisory role when it came to pesticides.  However, the board had 
broad public support.  At the NOSB’s semiannual in April 2004, a slew of commentators sided 
with the board and chastised the USDA officials in attendance.
50   
In May 2004, the secretary of agricultural bowed under what she said was “a tremendous 
amount of (public) interest” and revoked the guidance statement.
51  Public input had saved the 
NOSB version of the rules that reflected genuine compromise.   
 
(C) Harvey v. Venemenan 
(i) Mr. Harvey 
  However, the biggest challenge the NOSB-supported rules came not from big organic but 
from a lone organic purist.  A mere two days after the NOP final rules took effect in October 
                                                 
45 See id. 
46 See, e.g., Press Release, Organic Trade Association, Organic Trade Association Strongly Objects to National 
Organic Program’s April 2004 Guidance Documents and Directive, May 26, 2004, 
http://www.ota.com/pics/documents/FactSheet_All.pdf. 
47 FROMARTZ, supra note 17, at 202. 
48 S. Rep. No. 101-357, at 650-51 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4950. 
49 FROMARTZ, supra note 17, at 202. 
50 See id. 
51 Marian Burros, Agriculture Dept. Rescinds Changes to Organic Food Standards, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at 
A17.   13 
2002, a seventy-two-year-old organic blueberry farmer from Maine, Arthur Harvey, challenged 
them in court pro se.
52  For Harvey, the promulgated regulations were too weak; the purity of 
organics was at stake.
53 
  Harvey was a committed and persistent old guard member of the organic movement.  
Along with his farming, he was a third-party organic certifier and a member of the Organic 
Trade Association.
54  During the notice and comment period for the USDA’s first proposed rules 
in 1987, he personally submitted twenty-seven comments.
55   
  Litigation was not Harvey’s first choice.  In early 2002, he appeared before the NOSB 
and warned that regulations were “likely to be invalidated by a court if this Board and the NOP 
do not come to their senses.”
56  But what Harvey really wanted was just too extreme and onerous 
for recommendation by the board – a body whose diverse composition was designed to ensure 
compromise.  After Harvey laid out his vision for the organic rules at a NOSB meeting, one 
board member, apparently exasperated, asked Harvey, “You want us to start all over again.  
Right?”  To which Harvey responded, “I’m afraid you’ll have to do quite a bit of that, yes.”
57      
Food journalist Samuel Fromartz put it this way: “Many participants compromised in 
writing the organic rules, but Harvey felt core principles had been sold out.”
58  In his own words, 
Harvey said he was compelled to challenge the final 2002 organic rules:  “I had to do this, 
otherwise the government could get away with anything it wanted.”
59         
                                                 
52 See FROMARTZ, supra note 17, at ix-xi. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 Id. at 203. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.   14 
 Harvey had read through all 554 pages of the regulations and cross-referenced them with 
the underlying organics act.
60  His complaint alleged that nine provisions of the final rules were 
inconsistent with the underlying Act and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
61  Among those 
nine, were challenges to the National List that allowed the use of synthetic ingredients in organic 
food, as well as a challenge to the percent of organic feed required when dairy farmers transition 
their cows from conventional to organic milk production. 
(ii) The Opinion 
About a year after Harvey filed suit, a magistrate judge dismissed all but one of Harvey’s 
nine claims – seven on summary judgment and one on standing grounds.
62  The only victory for 
Harvey was a relatively small holding that the final regulations did not sufficiently regulate the 
rotation of wild crops lands in and out of organic status.
63  But the district court reviewed the 
decision and sided with the Secretary of Agricultural on all counts, reversing even that small 
victory for Harvey.
64  Harvey, however, was unyielding.  He appealed to the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals.
65  By this time, Harvey’s crusade in the courts had made waves in the organic 
community; he garnered support from several environmental groups that filed amici briefs, and a 
pro-environment, Washington, D.C.-based attorney represented him for a reduced fee.
66 
When the First Circuit’s ruling came down, it was immediately clear it was a watershed 
moment for organics – the first landmark case under the OFPA.  The appeals court began by 
                                                 
60 Id. at x. 
61 See Harvey v. Veneman, No. 02-216-P-H, 2003 WL 22327171 (D. Me. Oct. 10, 2003). 
62 See id. at *25. 
63 See id. at *24. 
64 Harvey v. Veneman, 297 F. Supp. 2d 334, 335 (D. Me. 2004). 
65 Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2005). 
66 See FROMARTZ, supra note 17, at 203.   15 
rebuking the lower courts for finding that Harvey lacked standing on any claims.
67  Then it 
delved into the merits.   
After dismissing the first two counts, the court turned to the third, which challenged the 
use of synthetic substances in processing.  The agency had approved thirty-eight synthetic 
substances for processing and handling organic food.  Harvey argued that this approval 
contravened the language of the OFPA, which provides in pertinent part that organic food 
handlers “shall not, with respect to any agricultural product covered by this title . . . add any 
synthetic ingredient during the processing or any postharvest handling of this product.”
68 
The Secretary argued that, despite the seemingly blanket prohibitory language, the Act 
also established the National List, thereby impliedly allowing exceptions.
69  The USDA, she 
argued, was acting under this authority when created the list of thirty-eight synthetics.  The court 
resolved the point by turning to the language authorizing the National List, which “contemplates 
use of certain synthetic substances during the production, or growing, of organic products, but 
not during the handling or processing stages.”
70  Because of the OFPA’s seeming distinction 
between earlier production or growing stages and later processing and handling stages, the court 
sided with Harvey on this issue.  The statutory language, the court said, “simply does not say 
what the Secretary needs it to say.”
71 
                                                 
67 Harvey, at 34, 35 (“Harvey alleges that the Final Rule creates loopholes in the statutory standards, undermines 
consumer confidence, and fails to protect producers of true organic products.  Harvey’s alleged injuries fall precisely 
within the zone of interests that the statutes at issue were meant to protect.”). 
68 7 U.S.C. § 6510(a)(1). 
69 Harvey, 396 F.3d at 39. 
70 Id. at 39.  The statutory language states that the National List allows synthetics in organic farming only if the 
substance:  
(i) is used in production and contains an active synthetic ingredient in the following categories . . .  
(ii) is used in production and contains synthetic inert ingredients that are classified by the Administrator of  
the Environmental Protection Agency as inerts of toxicological concern; or 
(iii) is used in handling and i[s] nonsynthetic but is not organically produced . . .. 
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The court continued to reject the Secretary’s argument that the statute was ambiguous, 
thus requiring that the court defer to her interpretation under the Chevron line of jurisprudence.   
The statutory language explicitly contemplated exemptions for synthetics used in “farming and 
handling” activities.  The statute then went on to spell out the requirements that must be met for 
synthetics to be used in “production” and to state that only non-synthetic ingredients could be 
used in “handling.”  In short, the statute seemed to contemplate exemptions for “handling” in one 
breadth before taking away such exemptions with the next – not to mention the alternating of the 
term “farming” with the term “production.”  Surely, the Secretary, argued, this was ambiguous.
72   
The court, however, declared the statute clear on this point.
73  The OFPA had established 
three prongs under which synthetics could find their way onto the National List.  The court read 
Prong (A) as clearly setting forth a threshold requirement that all exempt synthetics must pass, 
whether used in production or handling.
74  For the court, prong (B) narrowed that broader 
threshold requirement in prong (A) by explicitly banning all synthetics in handling, just as 
Harvey had argued.
75 
Having declared the three pong test unambiguous, the court sided with Harvey.  With 
that, the thirty-eight synthetics on the National List were still allowed for the growing of organics 
but they were suddenly not allowed for the processing and postharvest handling of organics.   
The other victory for Harvey came in regards to organic milk standards.  OFPA provides 
that a “dairy animal form which milk or milk products will be sold or labeled as organically 
produced shall be raised and handles in accordance with this title for not less than the 12-month 
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period immediately prior to the sale of such milk and milk products.”
76  The final rules agreed 
that organic producers were limited to feeding livestock a “total feed ration . . . organically 
produced.”
77  However, the final rule also established that when a conventional dairy animal is 
converted to organic, the producer may “[f]or the first 9 months of the year, provide a minimum 
of 80-percent feed” that is organic, and only has to use completely organic feed for the final three 
months of that conversion year.
78  The court interpreted the “total feed ration” language in the 
OFPA as being inconsistent with the agency’s 80-percent feed rule.  “The Secretary’s creation of 
such an exception in the challenged provision of the Rule is contrary to the plain language of the 
Act.”
79   
Harvey lost on his other counts,
80 but the victories on the charges regarding the National 
List and the dairy conversion were earthshaking in the world of organics.  In a later decree, the 
court gave the USDA one year to write new rules that conformed with its interpretation of the 
OFPA.  Products that were not in compliance with the court’s interpretation and the new rules 
would have to be pulled from the shelves within two years.
81 
(iii) The Reaction 
The court’s decision on the use of synthetics was viewed in the industry as “an atomic 
bomb.”
82  Harvey had aimed at big organic businesses, but he had hit almost the entire industry.  
The Organic Trade Association polled its members and found that 70% of them used at least one 
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synthetic on the National List.
83  The group’s executive director estimated that as high as 90% of 
organic products would cease to be “organic” if the First Circuit’s holding on the validity of the 
National List held.
84  Similarly, experts observed that the court’s ruling created a disincentive for 
conventional dairy farmers to convert their herds to organic production.  Without some 
synthetics allowable, feed costs would rise, making it more costly for producers to enter the 
organic market.
85   
Even the agrarian purists and Harvey supporters thought the ruling had gone too far, as 
barring all synthetics would destroy the burgeoning organic market.
86  The list of approved 
synthetics a compromise effort and informed decision by experts in the field, one reached 
because most of the interest groups involved recognized that at least some synthetics were 
necessary.
87  As Samule Fromartz observed, “By the time participants gathered to work on the 
OFPA, organic farmers had a wealth of practical knowledge about agricultural synthetics and 
listed those they viewed as indispensable.”
88  In fact, the NOSB had approved all thirty-eight 
synthetics unanimously in February 1999
89  The NOSB also had recommended the 80-20 feed 
rule after its September 2002 meeting.
90  Nonetheless, this had not deterred the First Circuit from 
striking down the rule too.   
The OTA lobbied Congress to cure the Harvey decision.
91  Congress responded quickly, 
attaching amendments to the annual agricultural spending bill in October 2005 that effectively 
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reversed the First Circuit on both the use of synthetics and the conversion of herds to organic 
methods of production.  Specifically, it amended the OFPA so that it prohibits the addition of 
“any synthetic ingredient not appearing on the National List during processing or any post 
harvest handling of the product.”
92  As for the herd conversion feed rule, Congress reversed the 
court in significant part as well, allowing the 80-20 rule ton continue at least until June 2007.
93   
(iv) Harvey Does Not Give Up 
Despite Congress stepping in to reverse the meat of the First Circuit’s holdings, Harvey 
was undeterred.  He filed suit in federal district court, again arguing that some of the organic 
regulations were out of line with the OFPA.  Harvey argued that the congressional amendment 
on synthetics only allowed synthetic “ingredients,” whereas the USDA regulations passed after 
the congressional amendment allowed the use of both synthetic ingredients and synthetic 
“processing aids” – a term of art that Congress had not mentioned.   
Harvey rested his argument on the fact that USDA regulations clearly define 
“ingredients” and “processing aids” separately.
94  Congress could have included “processing 
aids” in the amendment if it had wanted, but it did not.  Thus, “it must be assumed that Congress’ 
choice of the term ‘ingredients’ was intentional and means what it says,” Harvey argued to the 
court.
95 
The district court was not persuaded.  The distinction between ingredients and processing 
aids was a regulatory invention, published by the USDA in the Code of Federal Regulations, and 
not ever mentioned by Congress in the statute.  “Harvey’s claim that Congress intentionally 
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chose the word ‘ingredient’ as distinct from ‘processing aid’ is farfetched,” the court stated.
96  
The court went on to parse the First Circuit’s decision in Harvey and Congress’s explicit 
reference to it as evidence of congressional intent.   
But underlying the decision was the idea that Congress, if treated as a monolithic 
decision-making body, was entirely ignorant of any significant agricultural distinction between 
the two terms.  Harvey had argued that the district court’s discussion of the two terms in its 
previous ruling means that Congress “must be presumed to have been aware of the terms of the 
Judgement it was purportedly responding to.”
97  But the court was not willing to grant Congress 
that degree of omniscience.  The district judge wrote: “Much as it might be flattering to think 
that Congress concerned itself with what appeared over my signature, it is the decision of the 
regional court of appeals, the First Circuit, that concerned Congress.”
98  The court concluded that 
“the 2005 amendments [to the OFPA] eliminated the First Circuit’s statutory basis for holding 
the regulations in question invalid.”
99 
The plucky Harvey pressed on and appealed to the First Circuit.  When it issued its 
decision on June 24, 2007, the court’s first words made it clear Harvey had pushed too far.  
Judge Selya began the opinion: 
This  appeal  has  many  of  the  characteristics  of  a  civics  lesson.    One  principal 
characteristic  is  that  it  offers  a  window  on  the  interaction  of  the  three  branches  that 
comprise our tripartite system of government.
100 
After summarizing the first Harvey case, the 2005 changes to the OFPA, and the claims 
now before it, the court continued: 
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It seems incontrovertible that these [2005 OFPA] changes were a direct reaction to our 
decision in Harvey I.  It seems equally incontrovertible that . . . they were designed to 
pull hte legs out from under that decision.  Any other conclusion would ignore both 
Congress’s expression of interest . . . and the sequence of events.  Any other conclusion 
would, therefore, blink reality.
101 
The court characterized Harvey’s reading of the amendments as “crabbed” and the 
assertion that Congress intended to distinguish between ingredients and processing aids as “too 
clever by half.”
102  Finally, it affirming the district court’s decision, the First Circuit was overtly 
aware of the limitations of its competencies and legitimacy:  “Were we to accept [Harvey’s] 
perverse reading, we would be guilty of outright defiance of Congress’s easily discernable intent. 
. . . Principles of judicial restraint counsel powerfully against undertaking so confrontational a 
course.”
103   
And with that, Harvey’s five years of fighting for the pure agrarian ethos in court came to 
end.  At least for now.   
 
III. THE CASE FOR THE NATIONAL ORGANIC STANDARDS BOARD 
 
(A) Courts Lack Expertise and Competence 
Generalist judges are not well-equipped to issue decisions on organic food regulations.  
They lack the technical expertise of organic farming and a nuanced understanding of all the 
compromise interests that lead to those regulations.  They also lack the resources to educate 
themselves on these complex issues in the short time between when they land on their docket and 
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when they must write an opinion.  Elaborating on the strengths of agencies compared to courts, 
administrative law expert and legal theorist Adrian Vermeule has written:  
[A]gencies  have  a  superior  degree  of  specialized  technical  competence,  a  superior  understanding  of 
legislative processes (both in general and in the setting of particular statutes), a superior knowledge of the 
legislative  history  and  the  original  intentions,  purposes,  and  compromises  it  reflects,  and  a  degree  of 
political responsiveness that gives them superior information about both public values and policy-relevant 
facts.
104 
Indeed, the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference to agencies when statutes are ambiguous or 
silent was created in part out of recognition of agencies’ comparative advantages in this 
regard.
105  All of these judicial limitations apply even more so in the context of cases on organic 
food regulations.  Accordingly, courts should typically defer to agency institutions far better 
equipped to decide organic food regulatory issues than is the federal court system.  The Harvey 
case exemplifies why it is misguided for generalist judges to refuse to defer to the USDA and to 
overly involve themselves in the regulation of organic food. 
  First, it should have been clear to the Harvey court that there were big gaps in the organic 
food statute.  These statutory silences, under Chevron, should be filled in by the agency.  The 
court was wrong to overlook these statutory gaps and to declare the statutory language 
“unambiguous” and thus undeserving of Chevron deference. 
The question about approved synthetic chemicals for organic food raised in Harvey 
presented a classic question worthy of deference to the agency.  The relevant statutory passage, 
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at the outset, announced that it was about to lay out exceptions for synthetics in “farming and 
handling.”  In the next breath though, it mentioned exemptions just for “production” and not for 
handling, followed immediately by the discussion of a broad exemption process.
106  If 
“handling” did not fit into any of those exemptions, then what was the point of mentioning 
“handling” at the outset?  That was entirely unclear; indeed, the statute was silent on the matter.  
The agency’s view of the matter was a reasonable interpretation of a statutory silence, which is 
all that Chevron demands of agencies.  Thus, under Chevron, the court should have upheld the 
agency’s actions.  The statutory gap-filling at issue was the product of careful compromise 
among NOSB members, and it was crucial to the vitality of the entire organic industry.  The 
court appeared entirely ignorant of the history of compromise that led to the final rule at issue 
and how overruling it would destabilize the industry.
107  The court’s ignorance is forgivable, but 
less so its meddling when deference was warranted. 
Aside from technical expertise and familiarity with legislative and regulatory history, 
agencies are also better situated to decide statutory ambiguities that involve mixed questions of 
fact and values.  Indeed, Vermeule and Professor Cass Sunstein convincingly argue that, “[i]t is 
reasonable to think that by virtue of their specialized competence and relative accountability, 
agencies are in a better position to make these decisions than courts.”
108 
The Harvey court’s decision on organic feed in converting dairy herds to organic 
involved just such a question of fact and value that should have been left to the USDA.  The 
issue required some operating definition of what it means for a product to be “organic.”  
Elsewhere in the OFPA, Congress explicitly delegated defining organic to the USDA, with the 
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help of the NOSB.
109  The First Circuit should similarly have deferred to the agency’s definition 
of organic when it came to converting dairy herds. 
Before the First Circuit was a section of the OFPA that commanded conventional 
livestock to be “handled organically” for twelve months before their products could be sold as 
organic.
110  The Harvey court held that a dairy animal was not “handled organically” if it was fed 
anything less than 100% organic food at any time within twelve months before its products were 
sold.   
The court’s interpretation was reasonable for sure.  But the question at issue is not 
whether the court could parse the OFPA and come up with a reasonable interpretation.  The 
question, under Chevron, is whether the USDA’s interpretation of the value-laden phrase 
“handled organically” was reasonable.  The USDA’s reading requires viewing milk from a cow 
living on food that is 80% organic and 20% nonorganic for several months before the milk is 
sold is still “handled organically.”   
The definition of “organic” is something that the diverse organic interests had pitched 
battles over before the final rules were issued.   Ultimately, the agency’s final rules included four 
categories of foods that could be labeled “organic” to some extent.  Products for which every 
ingredient, including processing aids, were organic can be labeled “100 percent organic.”
111  If it 
has 95 percent organic ingredients, then it can be labeled “organic.”
112  The label “made with 
organic ingredients” can be used for products with 70-95 percent organic contents.
113  All other 
products can only use the word “organic” when listing any organic ingredients it may contain.
114  
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If the core definition of “organic” is a matter of percentages of organic constituent parts, the 
USDA should have leeway to define “handled organically” in reference to percentages agreed 
upon as a compromise by the relevant interest groups.  
But again, the First Circuit showed no sensitivity to the history of debates among organic 
movement members over what “organic” means, and it appeared unconcerned that Congress had 
side-stepped the value-laden, lexicographic matter and left it to the USDA elsewhere in the 
statute.  Instead, the court delved into the messy of issue of what “organic” means and, in so 
doing, struck down a regulation that then threw the entire industry into chaos.  It should have 
conceded its inadequacy to make an informed judgment on the mixed question of fact and value.   
Fortunately, the damage was minimized when Congress stepped in to reverse the decision.   
One may argue that the congressional response to the First Circuit was an example of 
inter-branch dialogue in a well-functioning democratic system.  But this is an idealized picture of 
democracy in action.  Congress does not have infinite resources.  Anytime Congress must step in 
to reverse a decision, it wastes valuable legislative resources.
115  “[A]gencies are likely to be in a 
better position to know whether departures from the text will seriously diminish predictability or 
otherwise unsettle the statutory scheme,” Vermeule notes.
116  Thus, agency decisions are less 
likely to lead to such congressional reversal.  When assessing how the branches of government 
should interact over organic food issues, we should consider these efficiency concerns. 
In sum, the First Circuit disagreed with the USDA on how it defined one value-laden 
term – “handled organically” – and on one ambiguous statutory section.  It was wrong to do so.  
The court was not just wrong on policy grounds, but more importantly it was wrong on the 
matter of institutional competency.  The court should have deferred to the comparative expertise 
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of the USDA and the NOSB.
117  Indeed, federal courts should defer to the USDA on organic 
food regulations typically. 
 
(B) Agency Capture 
The natural response to the argument that courts should give freer reign to the USDA on 
organic food regulations is that the USDA is far from infallible.  It is certainly true that, although 
the USDA is far better situated to make decisions on organic food than courts, it has its 
institutional weaknesses too.  Specifically, the USDA has shown a pattern of favoring one 
interest – that of big organic businesses – over other interests in the organic movement.  Indeed, 
USDA officials may have some expertise that the First Circuit lacked, but the agency has shown 
a tendency to issue rules and regulations that do not reflect a commitment to fair, transparently-
derived compromises.  
 The April 2004 guidance statements, which were issued to avoid as much public scrutiny 
as possible, are illustrative.  The statements patently favored big organic businesses, ignored 
NOSB recommendations, and were crafted behind closed doors and finalized without input from 
the public or the other organic interests.  Although the USDA rescinded the statements after a 
public outcry, the maneuver rightly called into question the USDA’s commitment to always 
fairly regulating organic food.  The whole affair suggested that the USDA was particularly 
beholden to big organic business interests over other interests.  As writer Samuel Fromartz 
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noted: “This regulatory seesaw raised questions about the USDA’s intentions, doing little to 
nurture a sense of trust in the government’s ability to oversee the industry.”
118 
This example fits with observations by interest group theorists.  As explained by 
Professor Einer Elhauge, interest group theorists maintain that:  
Voters and interest groups demand the regulatory results that benefit them, and legislators and agencies  
supply regulatory results to the highest bidder.  The results need not further the public interest. 
Indeed, fundamental distortions in the political process may lead to systematic divergences from the public 
interest.
119 
These scholars further argue that interest group influence over agencies is likely to favor 
interests that are concentrated and not diffuse, because “diffuse groups face greater collective 
action obstacles.”
120  This suggests that large centralized companies, like big organic businesses, 
are more likely to have influence over an agency like the USDA than a diffuse groups, like small 
organic farmers scattered throughout the country. 
However, not everyone embraces this view of administrative law.  They argue, 
convincingly in part, that government officials are not motivated just by the resources that 
interest groups throw at them but also by altruism, ideology, and the general public 
preferences.
121  While it is certainly true that interest group theory does not completely explain 
agency officials behavior, it is undeniable that “special interest groups often take advantage of 
[some] economic factors to exercise disproportionate public influence.”
122  When that 
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disproportionate influence is exercised in the realm of organic food regulation and the USDA, it 
is likely to favor big organic businesses over the interests of the diffuse purists.   
This is not to say that the USDA will always tilt in favor of big organic business.  But, so 
long as the USDA is even somewhat more likely to favor one interest group of the others, 
particularly in a way that it is not transparent and open to the public, then that it is an institutional 
fault that should be considered. 
This institutional fault may lead some to argue for stronger judicial review.  Two points 
counsel hesitance, though.  First, when agency capture happens behind closed doors, courts will 
not always know it has occurred.  Second, given judges’ lack of expertise for these technical 
matters, it is far from clear that courts will correct any capture problems the right way.  However, 
for organic food regulation, there may be a partial answer to both of these points.  As this paper 
argues later, agency regulations or guidance statements that appear to wholly ignore NOSB 
proposals are more likely the product of agency capture.  Courts are certainly competent to easily 
determine whether USDA regulations in fact align with NOSB recommendations.  Therefore, 
when NOSB recommendations and USDA decisions are patently out of line, courts can 
justifiably strike down the USDA’s decisions or demand more cogent justifications that account 
for broader public concerns.   
 
(C) The NOSB 
So, if courts lack the competence and the USDA lacks transparent fairness at times, 
where does that leave us?  Fortunately, NOSB members have the expertise that the courts lack 
and the transparent, deliberative decision-making processes that the USDA sometimes eschews 
to the detriment of its democratic legitimacy.      29 
In democratic societies, Stiglitz writes, “there should be a strong presumption in favour 
of transparency and openness in government.
123 Similarly, Vermeule has as noted: “In a 
democratic polity, the hinge that connects accountability and deliberation is transparency.”
124  
When it comes to transparency and deliberation, the NOSB has the USDA beat – giving it a 
greater claim to democratic legitimacy.   
Indeed, one scholar writing recently on advisory bodies noted their legitimacy advantage 
compared to other government institutions: “[M]any advisory counterparts consult extensively 
with the public in developing recommendations, and seek to defend their proposals on the basis 
of these consultation practices.”
125  Moreover, advisory bodies may “develop inhouse technical 
expertise” and “hold hearings open to anyone interested or curious.”
126  
These democratically-favored characteristics apply to the NOSB.  Consider the prime 
example of the National List of approved synthetics – an issue that is central to the purity and 
vitality of the organic industry.  The OFPA explicitly calls on the NOSB to advice the USDA on 
the matter and to consider which synthetics to include on the list during meetings that are open to 
the public and in which public input is accepted.  As Fromartz writes: “Lobbyists would not be 
able to push a synthetic through a back door of the USDA; the substance would have to be 
considered by the NOSB in public hearings.”
127 
Importantly, the NOSB is far less likely to evince bias or to be captured by special 
interests like big organic than is the USDA.  The NOSB consists of representatives from all the 
relevant organic food interest groups, not just the big ones, and it holds all of its decision-making 
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meetings in front of the public.  These embodiments of the democratic ideals of pluralist 
representation and transparency should give us greater confidence in the NOSB. 
Ultimately, the NOSB provides a crucial vehicle to ensure that the decisions on organic 
food represent compromises between all the organic movement’s interests because its fifteen 
members are chosen to reflect this diversity.  Moreover, because of its transparent deliberation, 
recommendations from the NOSB are more democratically legitimate and less likely to reflect 
the desires of anyone particular interest in an unfair way.     
 
(D) Argument of Deference if NOSB Followed 
All this should suggest that the NOSB is most likely to make the best – that is, the most 
informed and democratically legitimate – proposals for regulations on organic food.  Thus, as a 
policy matter, the USDA should follow the NOSB’s recommendations.  But the 
recommendations of the advisory board are just that – recommendations.  What can be done to 
ensure that the USDA regularly follows the board’s advice?   
One commentator has faulted the USDA for belittling the NOSB and argued that the 
USDA should “give the NOSB respect and heed the NOSB's recommendations on any changes 
to the organic regulations.”
128  Indeed, the Agricultural Marketing Services had criticized the 
USDA for not working to establish a “strong working relationship” with the NOSB.
129  But mere 
admonition by outside observers is not enough.  They provide no mechanisms to ensure that the 
USDA will indeed follow the NOSB.  
There are two ways to rectify that.  One way to ensure such deference is for Congress to 
mandate it.  However, such formal grants of authority to the board are unlikely for a couple 
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reasons.  First, as an empirical matter, it is rare in this country for Congress to endow boards like 
the NOSB with formal binding authority.  Second, giving the NOSB such power may eliminate 
some of its democratic strengths because “the possibility of augmenting an advisory body's 
powers through delegation would increase the incentives for lawmakers to try to capture the 
advisory counterpart and redirect it for partisan purposes.”
130  Furthermore, consider that the 
Supreme Court has held that the Constitution places substantial limits on Congress’s power to 
delegate nonjudicial function to federal courts.
131  Perhaps it is best for legislatures to face 
similar restraints when delegating non-advisory responsibilities to boards whose members are 
neither chosen through a typical appointment process or from the ranks of the civil service that 
do most of the work for our administrative agencies.    
  Instead, this paper argues that indirect pressure through the federal courts is the best way 
to encourage the USDA to follow the NOSB.  That is, federal courts should defer to USDA 
expertise generally, but they should engage in more searching review for organic rules and 
regulations that depart substantively from NOSB recommendations without clearly articulated 
and forceful reasons.  USDA decisions made privately and that depart from NOSB 
recommendations are more likely the product of agency capture.  When these kinds of USDA 
decisions are before courts, they are justified in demanding either that the USDA adopt the 
NOSB’s position or that it demonstrate the superiority of its position.  Importantly, in the Harvey 
case, the USDA was acting in accord with NOSB recommendations; therefore, more searching 
review was not appropriate there.     
Judges are well-equipped to review cases in this manner.  Judges may lack the expertise 
to routinely question the details of organic food regulations, but they are certainly competent to 
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consider process-related questions – such as whether the NOSB’s recommendations were duly 
considered.  It has long been noted that “judiciary’s familiarity with procedural devices that 
facilitate adjudicative factfinding”
132 places judges in far superior positions when they examine 
procedures and not substantive issues.  Moreover, any chance of judicial error due to lack of 
competence would be minimized because any opinion overruling an agency rule would align 
with the expert views of NOSB members.  This reliance on the NOSB’s expertise should 
alleviate, at least in part, those who are concerned that judges are not more likely to get things 
right, even given that agencies may be captured by a particular special interest.
133  
  As an empirical matter, the courts involvement here should be relatively rare.  To date, 
the USDA has appear to follow NOSB recommendations in most instances.
134  In the two 
instances when it did not – during the initial drafting of the proposed final rules and in the April 
2004 guidance statements – public outcry, particularly from organic purists, led the agency to 
back down.  In both cases, the agency ultimately issued rules that aligned with the NOSB.   
  But relying solely on public outrage to check the USDA every time it unduly sides with 
big organic businesses – or some other interest – provides only a tenuous check on agency 
capture.  It requires resources for interest groups to marshal the kind of focused public outcry 
that will lead a government institution to reverse course.  Groups may not have the resources to 
engage in such an outcry every time the agency slips through a rule that is it not fair from a 
deliberative perspective.  Knowing that courts will look more closely at rules that depart from 
NOSB recommendations will make the USDA even more reluctant to disregard the board. 
                                                 
132 Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have An Original Meaning, 60 OK. L. REV. 1, 51 (2007). 
133 See Elhauge, supra note 119, at 33 (arguing that “even if interest group theory succeeds in demonstrating defects 
in the political process, that would not justify the leap to the conclusion that more intrusive judicial review would 
improve lawmaking”). 
134 For a list of the NOSB’s final recommendations, go to 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/nosb/FinalRecommendations/FinalRecommendations.html.   33 
  If an interest group knows it is less likely to win favorable regulation by trying to 
influence USDA officials, it will likely then put more of its resources into influencing NOSB 
decisions.  But the board is better placed to handle such influence.  Unlike the USDA, where 
such interest group influence may occur behind the scenes and result in guidance statements that 
are the product of no public input, any interest group resources focused on the NOSB will be part 
of larger open deliberation on the matter at hand.  NOSB meetings are exactly the kind of public 
forum where we should want the slew of diverse interest groups in organic movements to 
hammer out their compromise rules and regulations. 
  The counter argument to this scheme is to question how courts can give deference to the 
NOSB but not the USDA.  The argument in this paper, however, is not that the USDA is 
unworthy of deference.  Rather, it is that when the USDA patently appears to have unduly 
ignored proposals from the NOSB, the courts are justified in looking more skeptically on the 
USDA’s actions.  The USDA does not need to follow the NOSB lock-step on every issue; but 
when it rejects the board’s advice and issues rules or guidance documents without transparency 
or clearly-articulated and forcefully-reasoned responses to NOSB and public concerns, courts are 
justified striking down USDA decisions.   
    
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
  Jim Pierce, of Organic Valley Family of Farms cooperative, once commented: “Hard as I 
try, I cannot think of another private-sector group being regulated that continually demands 
tougher regulations be inflicted on them.”
135  But not everyone in the organic movement does 
demand stricter regulations.  Impassioned purists often butt heads with big organic businesses 
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that want looser standards to determine whether their products deserve the “USDA Organic” 
stamp.  A mix of other interests – environmental and consumer, for example – often want to push 
the regulations in a different direction entirely.  This paper addresses how the different 
institutions charged with overseeing organic food to one extent or another – the USDA, the 
NOSB, and the courts – should interact to produce the best regulations of organic food. 
  The paper advances four arguments.  First, courts lack competency in the area of organic 
food.  Second, the USDA is not always transparent in its oversight and may in fact favor big 
organic businesses over other interests.  Third, the NOSB has the expertise that the courts lack 
and the transparent deliberation that makes its decisions less vulnerable to charges of unfairness 
or favoritism.  Fourth, courts should typically defer to the USDA on organic food decisions.  But 
courts should help ensure that the USDA follows NOSB proposals by engaging in more 
searching review of agency rules and regulations that are misaligned with the advisory board’s 
recommendations.  
 
 